

Security Information

4 April 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Operational Intelligence Support for the Office
of International Trade, Commerce Department

PROBLEM:

1. To improve the Agency's intelligence support for OIT Commerce in the pursuance of its responsibility for export control and for preventing insofar as possible non-US export to the USSR and satellites.

DISCUSSION:

2. Previous Arrangements: In June of 1951 the responsibility for strategic intelligence support for OIT Commerce was placed on ORR. Responsibility for the transmittal of data collected by OSO and OC and which would be useful to OIT Commerce with respect to enforcement of regulations applicable to U. S. firms was placed in OSC.

3. Commerce Department has been satisfied that we are doing all we can with respect to enforcement (taking into account the limitation arises

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4. The Commerce Department has, however, on several occasions indicated to our representative on the Export Control Committees a feeling that intelligence which might be useful in operational decisions is not reaching OIT in time to be useful and has prepared a list of criteria for screening and transmitting to OIT Intelligence Division raw information collected by the Agency (TAB A). ORR believes this is a legitimate request. It should also be noted that collated material in the form of intelligence reports and memoranda which deal with the type of material indicated in TAB A are desired and in fact, have to some extent been provided by ORR.

5. ORR will continue to be responsible within CIA for the development, analysis and evaluation of economic strategic intelligence through SECRET classification for OIT. ORR will also continue to represent CIA on various interdepartmental committees which advise the Secretary of Commerce in the field of export controls and to contribute intelligence support. Memoranda produced or correlated by ORR are transmitted, in accordance with regulations, directly by its representatives (or via OCD channels), to cleared officials of OIT, or presented in committees on which CIA is represented. ORR collaborates with OSI and CCI in development of intelligence of primary concern to those offices.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

6. OSO will be responsible for the selection of all SO material to be disseminated to OIT via OCD with the understanding that all clearances have been given by SO. As a check on SO screening, OCD in addition will read all other SO reports against OIT requirements and release to OIT after clearance approval by SO. SO will transmit direct to OIT urgent operational SO information, particularly with reference to paragraph 1 of TAB A.

7. OCD will be responsible for scanning all OO material on the basis of requirements submitted by OIT (TAB A). Clearance will then be sought of OO by OCD for those reports selected as being of interest to OIT; if such clearance is obtained, OO will sanitize each particular report and forward the sanitized version to ORR for information and comment as appropriate prior to transmittal by OCD to OIT.

8. Material transmitted to OIT will be forwarded under security guidance of I&S.

9. If the foregoing is approved the offices having action responsibility as indicated should be notified by O/DD/I and ORR directed to explain the arrangements orally to OIT, Commerce.

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Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

Concurrences:

ORR Concurred by telephone 8 Apr 52

OO _____

OSO _____

OCD _____

I&S _____

1. Information relative to the actual, suspected or attempted illegal movement of U.S. origin strategic and short supply commodities (as defined by the Department of Commerce Positive List of Commodities) or other U.S. origin commodities in actual, suspected or attempted violations of the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended.

2. Information relative to the actual, suspected or attempted movement of strategic and short supply commodities from any friendly or occupied countries to the Soviet orbit including any data relative to international parallel-export control discussions. Special emphasis should be given to information concerning this type of transaction wherein U.S. nationals are involved in any capacity, except in the consideration of CO reports.

3. Information relative to local export, import, financial, free trade zone, and transit trade controls, policies, procedures and changes in all countries.

4. Information relative to trade, barter and other commercial agreements and/or negotiations between nations with special emphasis on those between Western orbit and Soviet orbit countries, and with special emphasis on the degree to which such agreements and/or negotiations would affect the administration of the Battle Act.

5. Information relative to the movement of vessels (registry, transfer, cargo, bunkering, ships stores) and to port and free port activities insofar as they relate to export control (including the T-1 and

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T-2 orders) violations and/or the movements of commodities into the Soviet orbit.

6. Information relative to shortages in given commodities throughout the world, "dumping" activities or pre-emptive buying trends or other changes in the supply of, and demand for world commodities to include any large-scale international banking negotiations which would reflect such changes or illegal commodity movements.

7. Information relative to the management, principals, or activities of named domestic [REDACTED] or 25X1X2 foreign firms (or individuals engaged in commerce) which engage in or are suspected of undesirable or questionable commercial practices, or adhere to or have sympathy with political ideologies considered inimical to the interests of the U.S., or are suspected of such adherence or sympathy.